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by Michael Taylor
The author considers the policy background to the Financial Services and Market 
Act and the regulatory reforms introduced by the new legislation in a two-part 
article taken from a forthcoming book of which he is co-author.
The Financial Services and Markets Act ('the Act') gives legal basis to the radical reform of the UK's system of financial regulation announced by the 
government soon after the May 1997 general election. The 
extent of the government's radicalism in reformingo o
financial regulation took many practitioners and 
commentators by surprise. The Labour policy handbook 
New Labour, New Life for Britain had, perhaps deliberately, 
been vague about the new government's plans for financial 
regulation. It promised only to 'reform and strengthen the 
regulatory system' and 'to simplify both the structure and 
the nature of the system so that it commands the 
confidence of both the public and the industry'. While the 
Financial Services and Markets Act is consistent with both 
these statements, it goes much further than many 
observers had anticipated.
The obvious respect in which the Act is a radical 
measure is in providing statutory underpinning for the 
Financial Services Authority (FSA). This new authority 
combines the regulation of banking, securities, and 
insurance business and replaces no fewer than nine pre­ 
existing regulatory bodies. Indeed, the FSA is practically 
unique among regulatory agencies in the industrialised 
world in terms of the diversity of businesses regulated, and 
its very broad scope, encompassing both prudential and 
business conduct regulation. (Prudential regulation is 
concerned with the financial soundness of regulated 
institutions, whereas business conduct regulation is instead 
concerned with the way in which their products are 
marketed and sold.) While other integrated financial 
regulators have been in existence for some years, most 
notably in the Scandinavian countries, none has been 
established in a country with a financial sector of the size 
of that of the UK's, and all have an exclusively prudential 
focus. It should not be surprising, therefore, that such a 
radical reform of regulation, especially as it affects one of
the world's leading international financial centres, should 
have attracted such widespread attention far outside 
Britain.
A second respect in which the new Act is radical is in the 
range of enforcement powers it grants to the FSA. These go 
a significant way beyond the combined powers of the 
bodies it replaces. Especially significant are the FSA's 
enforcement powers in respect of its Code of Market 
Conduct. Under these provisions of the Act the FSA will be 
able to seek civil remedies, i.e. levy fines, against individuals 
or firms who breach the Code through insider dealing or 
attempted market manipulation. It will also be able to apply 
to the High Court for disgorgement/restitution orders. This 
aspect of the Act's radicalism had received greater public 
discussion than the unification of supervision, as speeches 
by Sir Andrew Large, the former chairman of the SecuritiesJ o '
and Investments Board, had stronplv arpued the case for a
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civil route for the disposal of such cases in parallel to the 
existing criminal law. Nonetheless, this change represents a 
substantial departure from past City regulation, while also 
conferring on the FSA a range of powers that are practically 
unique among other regulatory bodies in the world.
Although the Act's radicalism is apparent on the surface, 
in another sense it is also the product of a long process of 
evolution. Although the government's May 1997 
announcement was as sudden as it was unexpected, it 
nonetheless reflected the UK's experience of financial 
regulation over a period of many years. Thus, as well as 
representing a radical departure from past practice, the 
Act can also be regarded as the outcome of a long process 
of gradual change in the regulation of Britain's financial 
sector. The process of regulatory change was itself 
motivated by, and was at times a catalyst for, more 
fundamental changes in the structure of the regulated 
industry. Thus to understand the policy background to the 
Act it is necessary to understand the processes of both
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industry and regulatory change extending back over several 
decades.
The evolution of the UK's financial sector since the early 
1980s can be thought of as the gradual confluence of three 
previously quite separate streams. These comprised the 
Bank of England and the 'primary' banking sector; the 
organised markets in the City like the Stock Exchange and 
Lloyd's; and the rest of the financial sector, including 
building societies and insurance companies and licensed 
securities dealers. Each of these streams exhibited 
significant differences in the style and nature of regulation, 
especially in the balance between statutory and self- 
regulation.
The story since the early 1980s has been one of the 
gradual erosion and disappearance of the distinctions and 
boundaries between these different streams. Once distinct 
financial activities have become more closelv integrated, 
and financial institutions have become active in several of 
once distinct activities of banking, securities and 
insurance. Moreover, in parallel to this process, another 
has been in evidence in which the balance between 
statutory and self-regulation had shifted decisively in 
favour of the former in each of the three component parts 
of the financial sector. This has resulted in a primarily 
informal and extra-legal system of financial regulation 
being largely replaced by one largely based on statute. The 
two processes of regulatory and industry change are 
closely linked and have exercised a fundamental influence 
on the need for the type of regulatory consolidation 
represented by the formation of the FSA.
FINANCIAL REGULATION AT THE TIME OF 
THE WILSON COMMITTEE
To understand the process described above it is 
necessary first to give an account of the regulation of 
Britain's financial sector circa 1978, at the time of enquiry 
into Britain's financial system chaired by Eord (Harold) 
Wilson. Ironically, this report described a set of
arrangements that even then were on the verge of passingo & r o
away, but for this reason it is a valuable snapshot of a now 
vanished world. This description can then serve as the 
prelude to tracing the subsequent developments that have 
given rise to the formation of the Financial Serviceso
Authority. The emphasis of the pre-1980 period was on 
the relative absence of statute law from two of the three 
streams, in contrast to the third stream where statutory 
regulation played a very significant role from an early stage.
Prior to the passage of the Banking Act in 1979, Britain 
had lacked any system of formal authorisation or 
supervision of its banking sector, at least siijee the repeal 
in 1856 of Peel's 1844 Banking Act (7&8 Vict. c 113). (For 
a history of banking regulation in Britain see Heidi M 
Schooner and Michael Taylor, 'Competition and 
Convergence: The case of bank regulation in Britain and
the US', Michigan Journal of International Law, Vol 20, No 4, 
Summer 1999). Although the Bank was empowered, by s. 
4(3) of the Bank of England Act 1946, to issue directives to 
the banking sector, this power was never formally invoked. 
Instead, the Bank of England exercised informal powers of 
moral suasion over the banking sector, relying largely on its 
ability to dispense favours (especially access to its lender of 
last resort facilities) in return for co-operation on the part 
of the banks with which it dealt. These were principally the 
clearing banks, discount houses and accepting houses, 
which together constituted the 'core' or 'primary' banking 
sector. In addition to its powers of moral suasion the Bank 
also relied to a substantial extent on the forces of self- 
regulation, especially that exercised by organised 
committees of institutions like the Accepting Houses 
Committee or the London Discount Market Association. 
The efficacy of this approach to regulation was based to a 
substantial degree on the relatively small and concentrated 
nature of the constituency with which the Bank dealt. The 
widespread acceptance of informal norms of behaviour, 
including the acceptance of the Bank's unique 
responsibilities in relation to the rest of the banking sector, 
also served to ensure that the Bank's writ ran large.o
The Bank of England's relationship with the primary 
banking sector extended far back into the nineteentho
century when the Bank evolved from the dominant 
commercial bank into one discharging many of the 
functions of a recognisable modern central bank. Informal 
monitoring of the banking sector was conducted by the 
Bank's Discount Office which developed a number of 
characteristics that were later to inform the Bank's 
approach to statute-based banking supervision: it was 
informal, flexible, and — unlike the US — based neither on 
law nor on formal on-site examinations. The cornerstone 
of the Discount Office's approach to supervision was the 
interview — as it was to remain for much of the period 
following the advent of statutory regulation. The Bank 
regarded this type of regulation as 'non-statutory' rather 
than 'self-regulatory', since it followed from the 
'customary' and 'traditional' role of a central bank in 
ensuring orderly markets and prudently run banks (see the 
Bank's submission to the Committee to Review the Functioning 
of Financial Institutions, Second Stage Evidence, Vol. 4 at 96).
The second component of the pre-1980 financial sector 
comprised the organised markets, including the Stock 
Exchange, Lloyd's of London and the various commodities 
exchanges. Like the supervision of the banking sector, the 
regulation of these markets relied to a substantial degree 
on informal norms of behaviour rather than on statute law. 
The Bank of England took a keen interest in theo
functioning of these markets, albeit relying for its authority 
on City tradition rather than statute. It would not have 
been too wide of the mark to describe the Bank's self- 
appointed role in this period as the City's chief prefect, 
imposing informal disciplinary norms on the primary
Amicus Curiae Issue 30 September 2000
banks and organised markets alike, and representing the 
City's interests to government. It was in this capacity, for 
example, that the Bank played the leading role in 
organising the Council for the Securities Industry (CSI) a 
short-lived attempt to bring a greater measure of co­ 
ordination to City self-regulation.
Notwithstanding the Bank's 'prefectoriaP interest in 
them, the organised markets were genuinely self- 
regulatory bodies, displaying many of the characteristics of 
club-type arrangements, albeit subject to varying degrees 
of oversight by government departments. As the Stock
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Exchange explained in its evidence to the Wilson 
Committee, 'the principal feature of the regulatory system 
in the UK is that, within the general framework of the law, 
the authority of the supervising bodies is drawn not from 
statute but from the consent of the users of the market. It 
is a system in which the Stock Exchange has throughout 
played and still fulfils the central role.' (Committee to Review 
the Functioning of Financial Institutions, Second Stage Evidence, 
Vol. 4, at 16.) Stock Exchange rules were intended to 
provide protection to users of the market, of which the 
cornerstones were the companies listing requirements 
(administered under the Companies Act) and the system of 
single capacity, which prohibited members from acting as 
both broker and dealer (or 'jobber') in the old Stock 
Exchange terminology. Fixed commissions were also in 
theory supposed to provide the investor with a degree of 
protection.
Similarly, in its evidence to the Wilson Committee, 
Lloyd's insurance market also outlined a self-regulatory 
system in which 'the Committee of Lloyd's plays a very 
considerable part in supervising the operations of Lloyd's 
Underwriters, subject to the overall control of the 
Department of Trade. Before admitting a new 
Underwriting Member, the Committee satisfies itself as to 
the candidate's integrity and financial standing. Thereafter, 
the Committee supervises the conduct of the Annual Audit 
of accounts of every Underwriting Member. This form of 
self-regulation, which operated at Lloyd's for many years 
prior to the introduction of statutory requirements, works 
extremely well.' (Committee to Review the Functioning of 
Financial Institutions, Second Stage Evidence, Vol. 2, at 76—77.) 
What was true of the Stock Exchange and Lloyd's was also 
true of other City organised markets, like those for 
commodities or the fledgling market for financial futures. 
These organised markets represented City 'self-regulation' 
in the truest sense of the word, in that the setting of rules 
for conduct in these markets was left to the determination 
of self-governing committees of practitioners subject to 
only the most limited statutory oversight.
The role of statute law was completely different in 
relation to the third component of the financial system. 
This comprised a diverse group of institutions that had in 
common only that they were not subject to the City's self- 
regulatory traditions, and that their regulation was to a
substantial degree based on statute law. It embraced 
securities dealers who were not members of the Stock 
Exchange, the building societies, savings banks, insurance
O ' O ' O '
companies, and friendly societies.
The origins of the legislation governing this sector can be 
traced back into the middle of the nineteenth century, 
when Victorian social reformers attempted to encourage 
the habits of thrift among the great majority of the working 
population by facilitating new forms of saving institution. 
For example, the first Building Societies Act was enacted in 
1836, followed by another in 1874. To ensure the security 
of the modest savings of working people, the legislation 
resulted in a high degree of regulation. It limited the types 
of activities in which these institutions could engage, and
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subjected them to governmental supervision either 
through a dedicated regulatory commission (the Building 
Societies Commission or the Friendly Societies 
Commission) or by the Department of Trade.
SIGNIFICANT POWERS
Especially significant are the FSA's enforcement powers 
in respect of its Code of Market Conduct. Under these 
provisions of the Act the FSA will be able to seek civil 
remedies, i.e. levy fines, against individuals or firms who 
breach the Code through insider dealing or attempted 
market manipulation.
In some instances legislation was introduced specifically 
in response to certain types of financial scandal: this was 
true of the introduction of legislation on insurance 
companies which was influenced by a series of Victorian 
scandals, in particular the failure of the Albert Life 
Assurance Company in 1869 which gave rise to the Life 
Assurance Companies Act of 1870. A series of scandals also 
contributed to the regulation of non-Stock Exchange 
securities dealers following a number of 'share-pushing' 
incidents in the 1930s. The report of the Commission of 
Enquiry established to examine the matter, the Bodkin 
Committee, made recommendations that resulted in the 
Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act 1939 ('PF(I)'), which 
was effectively re-enacted in 1958. This required securities 
dealers who were not members of the Stock Exchange to 
be licensed by the Department of Trade.
An important feature of the pre-1980 system was that 
although the UK had never enacted statutory measures 
analogous to the US Glass-Steagall Act, which separated 
commercial and investment banking, its financial markets 
were nonetheless highly fragmented and compartmentalised. 
Stock Exchange rules effectively prohibited membership by 
banks, which were therefore prevented from evolving into 
continental-style universal banks. The activities limitations 
on building societies prevented them from becoming serious 
competitors to banks in the provision of consumer and 
commercial credit or the provision of payments services.
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Cross-ownership of banks and insurance companies was 
discouraged by the Bank ot England and the Department 
of Trade. Furthermore, various customs and practices 
served to limit competition, ranging from officially 
sanctioned cartels (like that among dealers in the 
government bond market) to the convention that banks 
did not compete with building societies for the latter's 
core business, mortgages. As a result the three streams of 
the financial sector remained largely separate and the 
degree of convergence between them was negligible. Until 
the end of the 1970s it was still largely possible to regard 
these three main elements of the financial system as 
belonging to distinct spheres, with their own traditions
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and styles of regulation.
THE 1980s AND THE ADVENT OF 
STATUTORY REGULATION
The pre-1980 system came under pressure from a 
number of distinct sources which served to undermine it 
from both within and without. The first such factor, at least 
in terms of time, was the secondary banking crisis of 
1973—75. The so-called 'secondary' banks were, by 
definition, outside the 'primary' sector which formed the 
focus of the Bank of England's non-statute based 
supervision. Instead, they were recognised as banks by virtue 
of s. 123 of the Companies Act 1967, the sole purpose of 
which was to exempt them from the need to obtain a licence 
under the Moneylenders Acts 1900—1927. It provided tor 
institutions conducting the business of banking to be 
exempt from the Moneylenders Acts on provision of a 
certificate by the Department of Trade. However, s. 123 
certificates gave legitimacy to the formation of a large 
number of 'secondary' banks, which were not subject to 
authorisation and supervision by either the Department of 
Trade or the Bank of England. The existence of this 
secondary banking sector, combined with loose monetary 
and fiscal policies in the early 1970s, combined to produce 
a speculative property bubble. When this burst the 
secondary banks were left heavily exposed to a property 
sector that was unable to meet its repayment obligations. A 
number of institutions faced serious liquidity problems, and 
as the crisis wore on a growing number of them became 
insolvent. In response the Bank of England launched the 
'lifeboat' a rescue package for troubled secondary banks to 
which it and the clearing banks committed £1,200 million. 
(For a detailed account see Margaret Reid, The Secondary 
Banking Crisis, London: Macmillan, 1982.)
The Banking Act 1979 was a direct consequence of the 
secondary banking crisis. Central to the Act was an 
attempt to preserve the Bank's traditional relationship 
with the core banking sector while requiring authorisation 
and supervision of the secondary sector. It thus drew a 
distinction between 'recognised banks' — the former 
primary sector — and 'licensed deposit takers' (LDTs). The 
remaining secondary banks were licensed as deposit takers
and were subject to more intensive supervisory 
monitoring than were the recognised banks. Theo o
distinction was a way of preserving the Bank of England's 
long-cherished principle of applying a flexible supervisory 
regime to those institutions with which it historically had 
enjoyed a close relationship. Although the Bank of England 
gained responsibility for banking supervision under the 
new Act, significantly from the point of view of more 
recent developments, both the then Prime Minister (Eord 
Callaghan) and Chancellor (Eord Healey) apparently had 
their reservations about its suitability for the role. (See 
Michael Moran, The Politics of Banking: The Strange Case of 
Competition and Credit Control, 2nd edn, Eondon: Macmillan, 
1986, at 120). Even some within the Bank argued against 
it taking on this responsibility, and consideration was 
briefly given to establishing a separate banking 
commission. Ultimately, however, the traditionalist 
position that regarded banking supervision as an essential 
central banking function prevailed.
LONG PROCESS
As well as representing a radical departure from past 
practice, the Act can also be regarded as the outcome of 
a long process of gradual change in the regulation of 
Britain's financial sector.
The 1979 Banking Act was replaced in short order by 
another, the 1987 Banking Act. The collapse of Johnson 
Matthey Bankers (JMB), a recognised bank under the 
1979 Act, revealed the deficiencies of the two-tier system, 
especially the Bank's limited powers to require 
information of the recognised banks. Thus, the 1987 Act 
abolished the two-tier banking system and introduced a 
single banking authorisation based on the concept of an 
'authorised institution'. It also granted the Bank 
significantly more extensive information gathering powers, 
including the ability to require banks to commission 
reports from audit firms to verify the information they 
sent it. Yet despite the extensive powers it was granted 
under the new Act, the Bank was perceived in some 
quarters to be struggling with its statutory responsibilities 
and, as Sir Thomas Bingham noted in his report on the 
closure of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International 
(BCCI), on occasion seemed reluctant to use its powers to 
the full. The Bank's role in both the BCCI episode in 1991 
and the collapse of Barings in 1995, attracted widespread 
public criticism and again raised doubts about whether itr o
was the right body to conduct banking supervision.
The switch from a non-statutory to a statutory system of 
banking supervision was accompanied by equally 
fundamental change in the City of Eondon's organised 
markets, and especially the Stock Exchange itself. A 
number of factors combined to undermine the City's old- 
established self-regulatory traditions and to pave the way
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for a statute-based system. Among them were the growing 
internationalisation of the City, as increasing numbers of 
foreign institutions began to play an active part in its 
markets, especially after the end of exchange controls in 
1979. The telecommunications revolution, which laid the 
foundation for today's integrated, global financial markets 
also facilitated this process. The government's privatisation 
programme, which aimed to create a new class of 
shareholders who had never before owned shares (the 
'Sids' of the famous British Gas advertisement), also meant 
that changes to the system of investor protection were 
necessary. As a result, the old systems of City self- 
regulation, which had relied to a substantial extent on the 
existence of a network of relationships underpinned by 
shared norms of behaviour, began to come under 
increasing strain.o
Although each of these factors was a major driver of 
legislative and structural change in City regulation, there 
were several other more specific factors that gave rise to the 
1980s revolution. The first was the Stock Exchange's Big 
Bang. This was the result of (Lord) Roy Hattersley's referral 
of the Stock Exchange's rulebook to the Office of Fairo
Trading under the Restrictive Trade Practices Act 1956. 
Following the change of government in 1979 the referral 
was dropped, but subject to an agreement (the 'Parkinson- 
Goodison agreement') between the then Secretary of State 
for Trade and Industry and the then Chairman of the Stock 
Exchange. Under the terms of this agreement, the Exchange 
agreed to abolish minimum commissions, put an end to 
single capacity (thus allowing the development of broker- 
dealers) and permit outside firms to take over member 
firms (previously outside firms had been limited to a 30 per 
cent shareholding.) The result of these changes was furthero / o
to dilute the sense of the Stock Exchange as a club with theo
ability to enforce its own membership rules. The abolition 
of single capacity removed what had been seen as one of the 
bulwarks of investor protection under the old regime.
In parallel to these changes was the review of investor 
protection conducted by Professor E C B ('Jim') Gower. 
This was established following a series of financial scandals 
in the late 1970s and early 1980s, culminating in the 
collapse of the Department of Trade regulated investment 
manager Norton Warburg. Gower's remit was almost thato o
of a one-man royal commission, with terms of reference 
that required him 'to consider the statutory protection 
required by private and business investors in securities; to 
consider the need for statutory control of securities 
dealers, investment consultants and investment managers;' o J
and to advise on the need for new legislation'. Gower had 
long supported the concept of a Securities and Exchange 
Commission for the UK (at least since his work on an 
earlier Royal Commission on Company law in 1960), and 
in his initial discussion document expressed support for it 
as the ideal. However, he also recognised that it was not 
practical politics, not least because of the City's 'rooted
opposition to a commission'. He accordingly proposed a 
system of self-regulating organisations which he believed 
would fill some of the gaps in the coverage of the old 
system. Importantly, it involved repeal of the PF(I) and 
subjecting all securities dealers, whether or not they were 
members of the Stock Exchange, to the same Securitieso '
Act. Under the proposed arrangements the Stock 
Exchange would become a self-regulating organisation 
('SRO') while there would be another SRO dealing with
^ ' o
public issues and takeovers. Gower's proposed structure of 
SROs was completed by one for the over-the-counter 
market and another for the unit trust industry. The 
government's role in this system was to be relatively 
hands-off, limited only to the authorisation and on-going 
monitoring of the activities of the SROs.o
The completion of Gower's report was pre-empted by 
the government introducing a bill which subsequently 
became the Financial Services Act 1986 ('the FS Act'). The 
FS Act contained a number of significant departures from 
Gower's original proposals. Although it stopped short of 
establishing a statutory securities commission, as 
advocated by the opposition Eabour Party, it nonetheless 
created a new body to oversee the work of the SROs. This 
body, the Securities and Investments Board, although a 
private company limited by guarantee, exercised powers 
transferred to it from the Department of Trade, and had 
the general responsibility to ensure that the SROs 
regulated in the public interest. Its first chairman, Sir 
Kenneth Berrill, argued strongly that, although the new 
body would not be responsible for the regulation of 
securities offerings, it would 'to all intents and purposes be 
exercising the powers of an SEC in this country'. 
Nonetheless, many commentators continued to compare 
the powers of the new agency unfavourably with those of 
the US Securities and Exchange Commission.
SEE CHANGE IN ATTITUDES
While it is possible to criticise the FS Act and its 
regulatory bodies both for matters of conception and 
execution (some of these criticisms will be examined 
later) this should not detract from the fact that the new 
regime resulted in a substantial sea change in City 
attitudes towards regulation.
Also significant was the structure of the system of SROs: 
instead of following the US system, as proposed by Gower, 
in which the Stock Exchange would have become an SRO, 
the regulation of brokers and dealers was separated from 
market regulation, and a new SRO established to regulate 
these firms. There were also SROs for futures brokers and 
dealers, for investment managers, and for investment7 o '
advisers. In addition, whereas Gower's original terms of 
reference had referred only to securities, the authorisation 
regime introduced by the new Act also encompassed
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complex products like life assurance and personal 
pensions. Hence the marketing and sales practices 
governing these products became subject to regulation for 
the first time, and an SRO was established to regulate the 
providers of these products. However, despite its 
otherwise broad coverage, the FS Act did not extend too '
Lloyd's of London, an omission which also drew criticism 
from the Labour opposition.
INFLUENCE OF PRIVATISATION
The government's privatisation programme, which 
aimed to create a new class of shareholders who had 
never before owned shares (the 'Sids' of the famous 
British Gas advertisement), also meant that changes to 
the system of investor protection were necessary. As a 
result, the old systems of City self-regulation, which had 
relied to a substantial extent on the existence of a 
network of relationships underpinned by shared norms 
of behaviour, began to come under increasing strain.' o o
The need to reassure a sceptical, and sometimes hostile, 
City community meant that the government stressed the 
self-regulatory element in the new system (in the words of 
David Lomax in his early study, London Capital Markets After 
the Financial Services Act, there was 'obscience to the 
principle of self-regulation'). In fact, however, the FS Act 
introduced a substantial degree of statutory regulation into 
the affairs of the City's organised markets for the first 
time. It also went a substantial distance towards erodingo
the distinction between the second and third streams of 
financial sector regulation. In particular, the non-Stock 
Exchange securities dealers, previously subject to the 
PF(I), were brought within the same regulatory apparatus 
as the Stock Exchange's membership. While it is possible 
to criticise the FS Act and its regulatory bodies both for 
matters of conception and execution (some of these 
criticisms will be examined later) this should not detract 
from the fact that the new regime resulted in a substantial 
sea change in City attitudes towards regulation. The 
Financial Services and Markets Act would simply have not 
have been feasible without the groundwork of itso
predecessor. In this context it is significant that although 
the Labour Party opposed several aspects of the FS Act, 
they did nothing to prevent it reaching the statute book.
The third stream of the UK's financial sector also 
experienced significant legislative change in the 1980s. 
The most obvious development, as just mentioned, was the 
replacement of the Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act with 
the Financial Services Act. However, other legislation also 
powerfully affected this stream. Most notably, the Building 
Societies Act 1986 introduced a significant-measure of 
deregulation into this previously highly regulated sector, 
permitting the societies to compete with joint stock banks 
in retail financial products, including current accounts. 
Given that the banks had a few years earlier moved into the
market for mortgages, once the exclusive preserve of the 
societies, competition between joint stock and mutual 
institutions was now intense. The privatisation of the 
Trustee Savings Bank in 1988 also added an extrao
dimension to competition in high street banking.
Overarching developments in each of these separate 
sectors was the growing influence of EC law on the pattern 
of UK financial regulation. The 1979 Banking Act had, 
significantly, been in part necessary to comply with the 
first Banking Co-ordination Directive. However, as part of 
the regulatory harmonisation required to complete the 
European Internal Market in financial services, the late 
1980s and early 1990s also saw a series of directives on 
specific aspects of regulatory policy. A number of these 
were based on the concept of a 'credit institution', which 
embraced both banks and building societies, thus laying ao ' J o
common platform for their prudential regulation. 
Moreover, the banking directives were premised on the 
continental European model of a universal bank. Thus the 
Capital Adequacy Directive, which set capital 
requirements for market risk for both banks and 
investment firms, raised the issue of how competitive 
equality between banks and securities firms could be 
preserved if the same directive was implemented by 
different sets of regulators.
EC law also resulted in the rules relating to banking 
regulation becoming more prescriptive than the Bank of 
England had traditionally favoured, given its preference for 
a flexible style of regulation. This preference had meant 
that the Bank had attempted to keep the number of 
detailed rules with which banks had to comply to the bare 
minimum, relying instead on the judgment of its individual 
supervisors. By contrast, the regulators established under 
the FS Act had formulated extensive rulebooks governing 
the behaviour of securities firms. The arrival of EC 
directives that applied to both classes of institution 
resulted in a growing convergence between the Bank's 
techniques of regulation and those traditionally practised 
by the securities regulators.
Michael Taylor
'Blackstone's Guide to the Financial Services Act 2000', by Michael 
Blair, Loretta Minghella, Michael Taylor, Mark Threipland and 
George Walker, is due to be published by Blackstone Press in 
September 2000. This extract is reproduced with kind permission of 
the publishers.
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